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Page:1

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1 affairs?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. Correct.

3 Mr. Baron. Were you an employee of the CIA during that
4 time on another assignment?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I was.

6 Mr. Baron. I would like to ask you some questions about
7 a series of events that occurred in 1961, simply to find out
8 whether you have any recollection of any of the names of
9 people involved or the activities involved that you may have
10 garnered either from personal contact with these people or
11 from subsequent review of the files involved.

12 First of all, in 1961, we have a record from the IG Report
13 of a meeting between **Jack Stuart** who was a CIA officer at that
14 time and a Cuban who we have agreed to refer to as AMLASH for
15 the purposes of this session today.

16 Our understanding is that a meeting was arranged by
17 **Carlos Tapedino**, who was known as AMWHIP, who served as an
18 intermediary between AMLASH and **Stuart**, and that the meeting
19 took place in Mexico City to discuss the possibility that
20 AMLASH might cooperate either with CIA -- strike that -- to
21 discuss AMLASH's views on the Cuban situation generally.

22 Do you have any recollection from any source of initial
23 contacts between **Jack Stuart** and AMLASH?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. Only the general recollection that
25 he was contacted about the time that you said he was, but no

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1 details on that.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source
3 about the source of the initiative for these first contacts
4 between AMLASH and the CIA?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

6 Mr. Baron. You are not aware of the CIA having taken the
7 initiative in this instance as opposed to AMLASH?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no. I don't know who
9 took the initiative.

10 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss these meetings with Jack
11 Stuart personally?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

13 Mr. Baron. Have you ever met Jack Stuart?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you meet Jack Stuart during the period
16 between 1963 and 1965 when you were involved with Cuban affairs?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall in what connection you dealt
19 with Jack Stuart?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. As a colleague in the Agency, but
21 not specifically on this operation.

22 Mr. Baron. Have you ever met Carlos Tepedino, who was
23 known as agent AMWHIP?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have.

25 Mr. Baron. And did you work with Mr. Tepedino specifically

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1 on the AMLASH Project during the time of your involvement in
2 the AMLASH Project?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, because he was
4 used before to serve as the contact and the interpreter, and I
5 didn't need an interpreter to work with AMLASH, so although I
6 knew him and I knew of him, he was not involved directly with
7 me in my contacts with AMLASH.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you meet directly with **Carlos Tepedino**?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. I know him, yes, or I knew him.

10 Mr. Baron. Although he wasn't serving as an interpreter
11 during the course of this operation, was he serving as an
12 intermediary between yourself and AMLASH?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. He was in contact with AMLASH. He
14 was a very close friend of AMLASH. He had served as an
15 intermediary, but during the time I was in contact, he did not
16 serve as the intermediary. In other words, I contacted him
17 directly. I contacted AMLASH directly.

18 Mr. Baron. And what role did **Carlos Tepedino** play during
19 the period of your involvement with AMLASH?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. As a friend of AMLASH. He knew what
21 AMLASH was proposing.

22 Mr. Baron. And would sometimes discuss AMLASH's proposals
23 with you in AMLASH's absence?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. I cannot recall any specific term
25 or any specific subject that we would have discussed, but I

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1 Mr. Rhea. Did William Harvey ever speak to you of the
2 use of gambling syndicate contacts in Cuba for any operation
3 whatsoever?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear, during the period of
6 '60 to '66 of any mention of the use of poison pills against
7 Fidel Castro?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

9 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear about the development of
10 poison pills at the CIA?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

12 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of the cryptonym: **MEAPRON?**

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

14 Mr. Baron. What did that cryptonym signify?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. That was the recruitment of sources
16 as I recall it. It was a project for the recruitment of
17 intelligence sources inside Cuba, primary military sources, as
18 I recall the cryptonym.

19 Mr. Baron. Was that the cryptonym from the asset
20 spotting project that you were working on with William Harvey?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember if it was at the
22 time that William Harvey was there or afterwards, I don't
23 recall the time period, but it was the overall operation for
24 the recruitment of sources inside Cuba.

25 Mr. Baron. Did you continue working on this asset spotting

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1 and recruitment project even after you began working on
2 AMLASH?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

4 Mr. Baron. And at some point that project came to be
5 known as ~~MEAPRON?~~

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but I don't remember exactly
7 when that cryptonym was given to the project.

8 Mr. Baron. Was removal of key military leaders around
9 Castro ever a part of ~~MEAPRON?~~

10 AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, no.

11 Mr. Baron. Who was the man in charge of Project ~~MEAPRON?~~

12 AMLASH Case Officer. I was, at a time.

13 Mr. Baron. You would have been called Project Director
14 or case officer?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer, yes.

16 Mr. Baron. Were any of the assets for the ~~MEAPRON~~ Project
17 also assets for Project AMLASH?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. They were not conceived that way,
19 but one or two of them crossed.

20 Mr. Baron. To your knowledge, were any of the assets in
21 ~~MEAPRON~~ who were not assets for Project AMLASH ever involved
22 in any kind of program of direct personal action against
23 Castro?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. No, they were not.

25 Mr. Baron. When you reported on Project ~~MEAPRON~~ to whom

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1 did you report?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. To FitzGerald.

3 Mr. Baron. After FitzGerald took over from William Harvey?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

5 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of FitzGerald's reporting to
6 anyone above him on **MEAPRON?**

7 AMLASH Case Officer. I assume that he did, but I did not
8 accompany him to any of the meetings.

9 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that he reported to Richard
10 Bissell on -- I'm sorry. Would you assume that he reported to
11 Richard Helms on Project **MEAPRON?**

12 AMLASH Case Officer. That would be the chain of command,
13 the chain of reporting, but I am not aware of what he reported
14 to Helms or anybody.

15 Mr. Baron. And do you have any direct knowledge of any
16 reporting FitzGerald may have done on **MEAPRON** to the Special
17 Group?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

19 Mr. Baron. Okay.

20 Do you have any recollection of a trip that Agent AMLASH
21 took to Helsinki in June of 1962?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. No details. I knew he had made
23 that trip.

24 Mr. Baron. But you were never involved during that period
25 of time with Project AMLASH?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

22

1 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I was not.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection as to the results
3 of that trip?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No specific, no.

5 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of contact
6 between the CIA and the FBI with respect to Project AMLASH?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

8 Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a report that
9 the FBI forwarded to the CIA about a meeting held between
10 **Carlos Tepedino** and the FBI?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I wasn't.

12 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection at all of
13 dissatisfaction expressed by **Carlos Tepedino** about the lack of
14 vigor with which the CIA was approaching the defection of
15 AMLASH?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. This was part of the record, of the
17 AMLASH record, but I had nothing to do with that, and I was
18 not involved in the operation at that time.

19 Mr. Baron. When you took over Project AMLASH, was it a
20 concern of yours to demonstrate to Agent AMLASH that the CIA
21 would be vigorous in supporting his actions?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. The primary objective, when I took
23 over the contact with AMLASH was to keep him in place and
24 convince him to return to Cuba and not to permit him to defect
25 and stay away from the island.

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1 or the state of affairs in the barracks? Can you be specific
2 there?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were looking for the
4 information at the highest levels.

5 Mr. Kelley. Your source of information from the highest
6 levels. You mean you wanted to know what the sentiment was in
7 the highest levels?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. That is right, and to develop
9 information on them, we had to develop sources in those
10 circles.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a contact
12 report that **William Wainwright** wrote about a meeting on
13 August 1st of 1962 that he held with AMLASH in Helsinki?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. I know that such a contact report
15 was in the file, but I was not associated with the operation
16 in '62.

17 Mr. Baron. Let me show you this, it is a copy of an
18 excerpt from that report, as it appears in the IG Report of
19 1967, and ask you if that refreshes your recollection in any
20 way?

21 And for the record, let us mark this AMLASH Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to
22 was marked AMLASH Exhibit
23 No. 1 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to read it through?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

3 Mr. Baron. Having looked at this document, do you have
4 any further recollection of ever seeing this document, or
5 discussing the meeting directly with **Wainwright?**

6 AMLASH Case Officer. I probably discussed the meeting
7 with **Wainwright.** I don't recall discussing these specific
8 items. I do recall that there was a contact report in the
9 files. Whether this was the specific one that I recall seeing
10 in the files, I could not attest to, but certainly it was a
11 practice to write contact reports.

12 Mr. Baron. Who was **William Wainwright?**

13 AMLASH Case Officer. He was the case officer who, with
14 **Tapedino,** met with AMLASH before I took over the contact with
15 AMLASH.

16 Mr. Baron. So he had the same position that you did in
17 connection with Project AMLASH and was your predecessor?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. He was my predecessor, as far as
19 the contact was concerned, yes.

20 Mr. Baron. Was there anyone else who was a predecessor
21 to you in any other sense?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.

23 Mr. Rhea. Before you took over Project AMLASH, what
24 office did **Wainwright** work out of? Was he under the DDP?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he was under SAS.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

26

1 Mr. Rhea. He was under SAS.

2 Mr. Baron. Which was?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Under FitzGerald.

4 Mr. Baron. Which was under FitzGerald who in turn was
5 under the DDP Helms, is that correct?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

7 Mr. Baron. After you took over from ~~Wainwright~~, did he
8 continue to be involved in Project AMLASH in any way?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not after the first meeting.

10 Mr. Baron. He moved on to a different assignment then?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

12 Mr. Baron. Directing your attention back to this contact,
13 or this excerpt from a contact report, I realize that you don't
14 have a direct recollection of seeing this contact report
15 except for glancing at it in the files, but do you recall ever
16 discussing with ~~Wainwright~~ the excerpt in the fourth paragraph
17 here where it says "He" -- referring to AMLASH -- "also wanted
18 to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriquez (a topranking Castro
19 subordinate) and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate
20 Fidel, by execution if necessary."

21 And then it continues, in the next paragraph, "While we
22 were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH
23 that schemes like he envisioned certainly took place, but that
24 a lot of coordination, plans, information collection, et
25 cetera were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and

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TOP SECRET

27

1 success of such plans."

2 Did you ever discuss this kind of desire to eliminate
3 Fidel Castro and others on the part of AMLASH?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, no. Not in
5 conjunction with this report, this contact report that is
6 shown.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you have general briefing sessions with
8 ~~Wainwright~~ when you took over from him as case officer on the
9 project?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. Was it in the course of his briefing sessions
12 that you generally discussed the subject that is referred to
13 here, the subject of AMLASH's desire to eliminate Castro by
14 execution if necessary?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. If this was mentioned, it was a very
16 small portion of the discussion about AMLASH. My primary
17 interest at that time in my discussions with ~~Wainwright~~ is to
18 find out who specifically --

19 (Whereupon, Senator Morgan entered the hearing room.)

20 Mr. Baron. Let's go off the record a minute.

21 (Discussion off the record.)

22 Senator Morgan. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony
23 you have given today will be the truth, the whole truth, and
24 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

28

1 Mr. Baron. You understand -- is it true that, now that
2 you are under oath, that you are willing to state that the
3 testimony you have given here this afternoon was the truth as
4 far as you know it?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

6 Mr. Baron. And you understand that your rights are still
7 intact that we discussed before? You have the right to counsel,
8 if you wish, the right to stop at any point and ask for
9 counsel, and the right to remain silent as we have already
10 discussed, and these rights are still intact?

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Baron. Now we were just discussing general briefing
13 sessions that you may have had with **William Wainwright** when
14 you took over for him as case officer for the AMLASH operation
15 and you say that you do not have a specific recollection of
16 **Wainwright** telling you that AMLASH was intent on eliminating
17 Castro by execution if necessary, is that correct?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. That is correct.

19 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that you generally discussed
20 AMLASH's desire to get rid of Castro with **Wainwright** during
21 your briefing sessions?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. In general this was mentioned, because
23 this was seen by AMLASH at that time as one of the means of
24 reversing the government in Cuba.

25 Mr. Baron. Presumably, if **Wainwright** was aware, as he

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29

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1 indicates in this report of the strength of AMLASH's desire
2 to get rid of Castro by execution if necessary, he would have
3 conveyed that to you in some way, isn't that correct?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but you also must recognize
5 that AMLASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament
6 was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something
7 like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk
8 about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath.

9 Mr. Baron. At the time that you took over Project AMLASH,
10 did ~~Wainwright~~ tell you that a specific means of overthrowing
11 Castro had been chosen?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

13 Mr. Baron. Then in this document when he says that "We
14 were making no commitments or plans" and then it goes on to
15 say that he wanted to make sure that AMLASH understood that
16 "coordination, planning, information, collection, et cetera,
17 were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and success
18 of such plans" what plans would he have been referring to there?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. It was true that
20 there was certainly no plans that I know of which would refer
21 to the elimination of Rodriguez, Fidel or the Soviet Ambassador,
22 general plans for the coup, for a military coup, maybe this was
23 what he was talking about. I wouldn't know, I don't know
24 what he was -- I wasn't there at the time and I don't know
25 specifically what he was talking about.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

30

1 Mr. Baron. Let's move on, then, to a few days later in
2 August of 1962; between the 10th and the 11th of August of
3 1962, ~~Wainwright, Carlos Tepedino~~ and AMLASH apparently met
4 in Copenhagen for further meetings. Do you have any recollection
5 of being informed by ~~Wainwright~~ of those meetings?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No, just on the general subject
7 that they had met, but not on any specifics.

8 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of learning from
9 any source that during the meetings in Copenhagen, assassination
10 was discussed between ~~Wainwright~~ and AMLASH?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. As a plan?

12 Mr. Baron. Discussed in any sense.

13 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I mean, it may have
14 been, but I don't know if it was specifically discussed by
15 him. But I do not recollect that ~~Wainwright~~ or anybody told
16 me that in Copenhagen assassination was discussed.

17 Mr. Kelley. Did ~~Wainwright~~ ever say to you that you should
18 not use the word assassinate with AMLASH for any reason in
19 particular because AMLASH objected to the use of that word?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I recall ~~Wainwright~~ stating
21 that AMLASH did not like to talk specifically about assassina-
22 tion.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you recall any time in your association
24 with AMLASH when he became upset when that word might arise
25 in conversation?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

31

1 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that he specifically
2 used that word. He would use such words as "neutralization,"
3 but not specifically "assassination."

4 Mr. Baron. And when he would use a word like neutraliza-
5 tion, he would be referring to assassination, is that a fair
6 assumption?

7 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, yes and no. We were talking
8 about the removal from power of Castro, which could mean
9 assassination, but could also mean just physically remove him
10 without killing him.

11 Mr. Baron. Let me show you for a moment an excerpt from
12 a contact report written by ~~Wainwright~~ about his meetings on
13 August 10th and 11th, 1962. He refers in this excerpt for the
14 record to the fact that they were "discussing various aspects
15 of AMLASH's future role in Cuba." And he says, "we used the
16 term assassinate, which was most objectionable to AMLASH and
17 he became visibly upset."

18 And then he goes on to say, "It was not the act he
19 objected to but merely the choice of the word used to describe
20 it. Eliminate was acceptable."

21 Does that fit with your understanding of the way AMLASH
22 related to the concept of assassination and the use of the
23 word assassination?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. Generally speaking yes, because we
25 never -- I certainly never raised the subject of assassination

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

33

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1 Mr. Baron. Does this description by ~~Wainwright~~ of the
2 fact that AMLASH would not object to the act of assassination
3 but rather to the word, fit with your understanding of
4 AMLASH's character? That he would have no particular objection
5 to contemplating assassination?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. That is difficult for me to say
7 because as I say, we never discussed this subject in that
8 detail.

9 Mr. Baron. Did he ever use the term eliminate Castro
10 to you to the best of your recollection?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. I recall the word neutralize more
12 than eliminate.

13 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that they would have meant
14 the same thing?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, vaguely, I guess. It would
16 probably mean the same thing.

17 Mr. Baron. And that they could be fairly interpreted
18 in this context as a euphemism that AMLASH might use, because
19 he was uncomfortable with the word assassination?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. It could be. I mean, I could not
21 state specifically whether he was using it because he was
22 uncomfortable with the word assassination, or because he was
23 uncomfortable with the act itself. This is difficult for
24 me to clarify for you.

25 Mr. Baron. All right.

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TOP SECRET

34

1 Did you ever learn of a meeting later in August between
2 AMLASH, ~~Trepedino, Wainwright and Earl Williamson?~~ Do you
3 have any recollection of being told about such a meeting?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. Only in general terms.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you know ~~Earl Williamson?~~

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Not at that time.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you come to know ~~Earl Williamson~~ during
8 the course of your association with Project AMLASH?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

10 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the fact that AMLASH was
11 given any kind of special training in France during 1962?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Only a vague recollection from the
13 file.

14 Mr. Baron. And what is your recollection?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if it was training
16 or if it was a demonstration in explosives, but no more than
17 that.

18 Mr. Baron. Why would he be given this kind of training?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know.

20 Mr. Baron. Wouldn't this kind of training be for the
21 purpose of operations that he might perform inside Cuba?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. I do not specifically know if there
23 were any plans for such operations. If such --

24 Mr. Baron. I'm not asking right now if there were plans
25 or not, but simply what the purpose of the training would have

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1 been?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know.

3 Mr. Baron. To create the capability to perform such
4 operations. Is that a fair way to put it?

5 AMLASH Case Officer. It would appear that that's what it
6 would be, but I don't know that those were the plans.

7 Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any S/W training that
8 was given to AMLASH?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Only from having heard that he was
10 given S/W training.

11 Mr. Baron. And is that secret writing training?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. Secret writing.

13 In order for him to be able to communicate off-island, if
14 he returned.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a cable that
16 **Earl Williamson** sent to CIA Headquarters on August 17 which
17 indicated that AMLASH might try to carry out an assassination
18 attempt on his own initiative?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. I do not have any recollection at that
20 time. Reading the file afterwards, I know a cable was sent.
21 Specifically what it said, I do not recall.

22 Mr. Baron. But you do remember that a cable was sent to
23 the effect that AMLASH might try a physical elimination mission
24 against Castro on his own?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I do not specifically remember

TOP SECRET

1 that.

2 Mr. Baron. What do you recollect about the cable?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. The one of the fact that he had been
4 given the explosives training, or the demonstration in explosives,
5 but specifically that it mentioned assassination, I do not
6 recall.

7 Mr. Baron. Let me draw your attention now to a document
8 we will mark AMLASH 3, which is a one sentence excerpt from a
9 cable from ~~Earl Williamson~~, who was a case officer of the CIA,
10 to CIA Headquarters, cabled on August 17, 1962.

11 (The document referred
12 to was marked AMLASH
13 Exhibit No. 3 for
14 identification.)
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TOP SECRET

37

1 Mr. Baron. After reading this cable, do you ever remember
2 seeing that before?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

4 Mr. Baron. Were you ever briefed by ~~Wainwright~~ or anyone
5 else on the fact that the CIA was aware that AMLASH could or
6 might try to carry out on his own initiative a physical
7 elimination mission against Castro?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. It was mentioned to me, but only in
9 the most general terms, not in any specific plan that he had to
10 do it.

11 Mr. Baron. And what kind of general terms would it have
12 been that he would do it?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Primarily, as I recall, in the terms
14 of his -- the fact that he did not like to use the term assass-
15 ination.

16 Again, getting back to what I mentioned before in the
17 terms of elimination or neutralization of the leadership, but
18 not specifically of an assassination, a specific assassination
19 attempt against Castro. It was in those general terms that I
20 recall it, not in specific terms.

21 Mr. Baron. In looking at this cable, however, would you
22 agree that the physical elimination mission that is referred
23 to there where it says "Have no intention give AMLASH physical
24 elimination mission" is probably an assassination attempt
25 against Castro? In other words, ~~Williamson~~ is saying I have no

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

41

1 yourself and AMLASH?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. ~~Wainwright~~ went down there to
3 introduce me to AMLASH.

4 Mr. Baron. Do you remember if ~~Carlos Tepedino~~ was also
5 present?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. ~~Tepedino~~ also went on that trip, yes.

7 Mr. Baron. And what was the purpose of that trip?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. To introduce AMLASH to me as a
9 Spanish-speaking case officer.

10 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any specific discussions you
11 had with AMLASH about the role he might play inside Cuba?

12 AMLASH Case Officer. During the first meeting, as I
13 recall, we primarily discussed the situation in Cuba, the
14 internal situation vis-a-vis Castro personalities who were
15 unhappy for one reason or another with the Castro regime.

16 Mr. Baron. In general, what was AMLASH's assessment at
17 that time of the strength of the Castro regime?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. As I recall, it was strong. There
19 were many people around Castro, and this was the high military
20 officers who were unhappy with the Communist orientation of
21 the regime, but many of these officers were still, as he
22 reported at that time, were either still loyal to Castro or
23 were afraid of the consequences if their disloyalty was found
24 out.

25 Mr. Baron. And AMLASH himself was willing to participate

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

44

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1 everything that was being done, as far as I understood it,
2 was to foment a military coup. That was the objective.

3 Mr. Kelley. And where did you understand this from? Who
4 gave direction and shape to the program in which you were
5 working?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I worked for FitzGerald. I
7 worked for Desmond FitzGerald.

8 Mr. Baron. Who was at that time Chief of Task Force W?
9 AMLASH Case Officer. He was the Chief of the Task Force.

10 Mr. Baron. Or Chief of SAS?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. Or SAS.

12 Mr. Baron. Do you recall telling AMLASH to assist a man
13 who was known as AMTRUNK in his intelligence assignments within
14 Cuba?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't specifically ask him to
16 assist AMTRUNK-10, because he was one of the ones of the
17 assets we had unilaterally recruited inside Cuba. In my
18 discussions with AMLASH, I found out for the first time that
19 he was also a friend and in contact with AMTRUNK-10.

20 Mr. Baron. And do you recall the mission that AMTRUNK-10
21 had at that time?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. It was very early in the operation.
23 It was a matter of establishing communications with him at that
24 time. Again, he was going to be used to develop the intelli-
25 gence that we were trying to develop.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

45

1 Mr. Baron. Was AMTRUNK-10 a military officer, high
2 military officer in the Cuban Army?

3 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he was.

4 Mr. Baron. And he was in some sort of regular contact
5 with you as case officer for this project?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Only through a courier who had been
7 infiltrated to the island at that time.

8 Mr. Baron. In early September of 1963, do you recall
9 AMLASH expressing any kind of dissatisfaction with the willing-
10 ness of the CIA to help him out? Do you recall any thought
11 that he might not want to see you again shortly after that
12 meeting in Brazil?

13 AMLASH Case Officer. Only in a letter or message that I
14 recall that was received by Tepedino, and he had expressed his
15 feeling at that time that the way it was interpreted that he
16 decided to defect. In other words, he wasn't interested in
17 carrying on any further conversations about the possibility of
18 returning to Cuba.

19 Mr. Baron. Did you meet with him, or did he defect
20 thereafter?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't.

22 Mr. Baron. And did you meet with him shortly thereafter
23 in the beginning of October in Paris?

24 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

25 Mr. Baron. Had he changed his mind about defecting at that

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46

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1 point?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, but he was willing
3 to, again, discuss the possibility of returning.

4 Mr. Baron. Had anything specific happened to antagonize
5 him in Brazil so that he would not want to see you again?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

7 Mr. Baron. Was he asking for any particular kind of
8 support at that point, other than help in defecting?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically make
10 any requests of me, except if he did return to Cuba that he
11 would expect our support and assurances of our support.

12 Mr. Baron. And did he make this clear to you in Paris
13 in early October?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you know **John Red Stent?**

16 AMLASH Case Officer. He was in Paris at that time.

17 Mr. Baron. And he was working for the CIA in Paris at
18 the time?

19 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

20 Mr. Baron. And do you recall that **Richard Long** was also
21 working for the CIA at that time in Paris?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. In Paris, yes.

23 Mr. Baron. Do you recall that they participated in the
24 meetings with AMLASH in early October in Paris?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. They did not participate in my

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47

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1 meetings with AMLASH. They met AMLASH to pass him a message
2 telling him that I was coming and that I would be there to
3 talk to him.

4 Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning in very early October
5 that the [REDACTED]

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Vaguely. I vaguely recall being
7 told by the people in Paris that this was the case. I did not
8 detect at any time I was in contact with him [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]
10 Mr. Baron.

11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]
13 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

14 Mr. Baron.
15 [REDACTED]

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Later on I was aware of it. At that
17 time, I wasn't.

18 Mr. Baron. Later on in October, around the 11th of
19 October in '63, do you recall any particular kind of request
20 that AMLASH was asking you to make to people back in Headquarters
21 at the CIA?

22 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

23 Again, he had not decided himself as to whether he would
24 defect or return to Cuba. If he decided to return to Cuba, he
25 wanted several things. First of all, he wanted the assurances

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59

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't.

2 Mr. Bayly. Did you think there was any subterfuge or
3 funny business going on?

4 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

5 Mr. Baron. Do you remember then a meeting that took place
6 subsequently in Paris with AMLASH and FitzGerald and yourself
7 present?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

9 Mr. Baron. And to the best of your recollection, would
10 October 29, 1963 be the date of that meeting?

11 AMLASH Case Officer. It was late October, yes.

12 Mr. Baron. Did you serve as the interpreter at that
13 meeting?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

15 Mr. Baron. And did FitzGerald use an alias?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. Do you remember his alias?

18 AMLASH Case Officer. James Clark, I believe it was.

19 Mr. Baron. And was **Red Stent** present at that meeting?

20 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

21 Mr. Baron. What do you remember about the discussion at
22 that meeting?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. It was a discussion in which
24 FitzGerald assured AMLASH, gave him the assurances that he was
25 looking for, that the United States' government was prepared

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

71

1 Senator Morgan. As I recall, most of them were shot.

2 AMLASH Case Officer. No, the whole group was reduced. In
3 fact, two of them were let go. He and AMTRUNK-10 were given
4 twenty-five years, I may be wrong.

5 Senator Morgan. Well, they were, but I'm talking about
6 other than this group of people who were involved with AMLASH.

7 What I am really asking is, do you think there is any
8 possibility that Castro knew what was going on all of the time?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. That is a very good question, but
10 I have nothing that I could say definitively that he did. It
11 was something that we were always checking, that we were very
12 sensitive to, that we had a double agent, shall we say, on our
13 hands, and we did not have any indication at the time I was
14 involved with the operation that he had been run into us by
15 Castro.

16 Senator Morgan. Does it strike you as somewhat unusual
17 that during all of this time while you were talking about a
18 military coup, you were providing guns and hidden hypodermic
19 needles and et cetera that nothing ever came of it? This is
20 the thing that disturbs me, or makes me wonder, is, you know,
21 I don't think there is any question but what if they had really
22 been concerned they could have brought about the execution of --

23 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, Senator, the thing is, your
24 reference to the hypodermic thing, it was shown to him, it
25 wasn't given to him, he never took that in with him.

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TOP SECRET

86

1 AMLASH Case Officer. He did not specifically state this,
2 but this could be one type, yes.

3 Mr. Baron. Let me ask you first whether you remember a
4 contact report written by ~~Wainwright~~ after ~~Wainwright~~ met with
5 ~~Repedino~~ in New York in mid-November, 1963, in which ~~Wainwright~~
6 explains what AMLASH's reaction was to this whole meeting.

7 Do you remember such a contact report?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember the contact report.
9 I remember there was some kind of word back that AMLASH was
10 generally, again, pleased with the meeting that he had had,
11 but I don't remember the details as to what else.

12 The policy assurance had been given to him and he was
13 satisfied with that. He now wanted to discuss the specific
14 support that he thought he needed, both to initiate a coup and
15 to protect himself. So these were the issues that were still
16 being discussed at that time.

17 Mr. Baron. All right.

18 Let's move then to whatever thinking you and FitzGerald
19 and anyone else at CIA did about the kind of support to be
20 provided, what kind of discussions did you have following this
21 meeting with FitzGerald or anyone else in the Cuban Task Force
22 about the kind of support to be provided at this point?

23 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested the high-powered
24 rifles with the scopes and these were the center of the
25 discussion, because -- well, as to whether these would be, a

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93

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1 ask you, I would just like for you to take a look at a document
2 that will be called Exhibit No. 8. This is excerpted in the
3 IG Report, and it is a contact report written by ~~Wainwright~~
4 that reports a meeting he had with ~~Pepedino~~ in New York City
5 in which ~~Pepedino~~ explained AMLASH's reaction to the meeting
6 with FitzGerald.

(The document referred
to was marked AMLASH
Exhibit No. 8 for
identification.)

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

94

1 Mr. Rhea. I wanted particularly to draw your attention
2 to the sentence halfway through the paragraph which says that
3 he, meaning AMLASH, could not understand why he was denied
4 certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final
5 solution to the problem, parenthetically, that refers to the
6 Cuban problem and Castro's control of the island, while, on
7 the other hand, the U.S. government gave much equipment and
8 money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against
9 Cuban coastal targets.

10 The first question I have about that particular document
11 is do recall which small pieces of might be referred to in
12 this contact report, which is admittedly secondhand, this
13 report from ~~Tepedino~~ to ~~Wainwright~~. Do you have any idea what
14 small pieces of equipment might be referred to?

15 AMLASH Case Officer. No, not specifically, except to
16 believe that this would be the small piece of esoteric type of
17 equipment that he would need to defend himself because this is
18 what had been denied him, so I am only saying this from what
19 I know at that time. He would be unhappy with the technical
20 support, because on 14 November, he had not been told that he
21 would get a cache or that he would be given any kind or shown
22 any kind of small equipment, esoteric equipment, that he thought
23 he needed.

24 Mr. Rhea. All right.

25 This leads us into the main event I would like to talk with

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95

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1 you about, and that is the decision by people within the CIA
2 to manufacture a pen that would be rigged with a hypodermic
3 needle which could eject a poison into someone.

4 We have had various testimony on what this event means,
5 and I would like to get your impression of it.

6 To work into it in an orderly fashion, first, when do you
7 first recall any discussions about producing a poison pen or
8 any discussions of that type, to give to AMLASH?

9 AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when
10 this matter was raised. It certainly just have taken place
11 after the 29 October meeting.

12 Mr. Rhea. Would you date it before the November 14th
13 meeting?

14 AMLASH Case Officer. No, because in fact he didn't know
15 that -- nobody knew that this was even -- I didn't know that
16 this was a possibility until two or three days before the
17 22 November meeting.

18 Mr. Baron. Let's go off the record.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 Mr. Baron. For the record, there was no meeting on the
21 14th of November, that was simply the date on which ~~Wainwright~~
22 reportedly met with ~~Tapedino~~ in New York City to discuss
23 AMLASH's reaction to the Paris meeting on October the 29th.

24 Mr. Rhea. Were you involved in the decision to produce
25 this poison pen?

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123

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1 part referring to you?

2 AMLASH Case Officer. No, just the part referring to me.

3 Mr. Schwarz. With respect to the part that refers to
4 you, I take it you have got no knowledge about Mr. McCone's
5 awareness of any of that material?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

7 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

8 AMLASH Case Officer. And to the best of my recollection,
9 there's nothing in my part of the IG Report.

10 Mr. Schwarz. No, there is not. You are correct.

11 Mr. Rhea. I would like to ask you about some cables and
12 references in the IG Report, even though you've testified you
13 were not personally aware of any of these weapons drops, I
14 would like for you to help us clear up some terms.

15 (Discussion off the record.)

16 Mr. Rhea. Are you familiar with the term AMTRUNK?

17 AMLASH Case Officer. It was -- I recall the term AMTRUNK
18 which was one of the cryptonyms used for the group of, a
19 certain group of military officers or agents inside Cuba. I
20 can specifically recall the one of them that we talked about
21 before was AMTRUNK-10. What it meant, I don't know.

22 Mr. Rhea. Would the AMTRUNK operation be comparable to
23 the AMLASH Operation but simply involve different characters?
24 Would that be a fair way to characterize it.

25 AMLASH Case officer. Yes, that would be a fair way to

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

125

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1 AMLASH Case Officer. As I stated before, I don't speci-
2 fically remember that he requested FAL's. What I vaguely
3 remember is at some time he made mention that he owned an FAL,
4 that he had an FAL in his home in Cuba.

5 Mr. Rhea. Would you have any reason to doubt, aside from
6 faulty memory would you have any reason to doubt that he did
7 request FAL's be included in the drop?

8 AMLASH Case Officer. He could have.

9 Mr. Rhea. You have no recollection at all?

10 AMLASH Case Officer. No.

11 Mr. Rhea. Are you familiar with the name **Carlos Jorge**

12 **Robreno?**

13 AMLASH Case Officer. I vaguely recall that he was one of
14 the people that was involved with AMLASH.

15 Mr. Rhea. Do you recall his role?

16 AMLASH Case Officer. No, because when I was in the
17 operation he was not active in any way except that AMLASH had
18 mentioned him as one of the people he could use.

19 Mr. Rhea. Are you familiar with a request by AMLASH for
20 silencers for FAL rifles?

21 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically that he
22 made this request of me.

23 Mr. Rhea. Do you recall discussing silencers with him
24 for any purpose?

25 AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

128

1 you have anything there?

2 Mr. Rhea. I do. I want to show you a few things in
3 there.

4 Again, I want to get your opinion on some summaries in the
5 IG Report.

6 I will hand you Exhibit No. 9, which appears on page 100
7 of the Inspector General's Report which is an excerpt of a
8 memorandum allegedly prepared by you and left with **Robert Owen**
9 **Paris Station** on December 10, 1964.

(The document referred
to was marked AMLASH
Exhibit No. 9 for
identification.)

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25

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

134

1 that in his opinion at that time was necessary to carry off a
2 coup.

3 Mr. Rhea. But knowing what he planned on doing,
4 you felt it was quite proper to put him in touch with people
5 who could enable him to do that?

6 AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I don't think it was felt, it
7 wasn't a matter of it being proper or improper. The objective
8 for a military coup inside Cuba still existed.

9 There was a group on the outside -- it was bigger than
10 just that part of the operation, in other words, to put him in
11 touch with just the people who would provide him with the arms
12 to eliminate the leadership, because we never got down with
13 him to talking about that specific operation.

14 In other words, Arttime had a group on the outside that
15 could give him general support, any kind of support, which we
16 would have to conclude included providing any weapons that he
17 had requested.

18 Mr. Rhea. Let me read you one further statement in the
19 Inspector Generals Report which I will then ask you about. It
20 is a parenthetical statement that is captioned as a comment,
21 and it refers to your testimony before the Inspector General,
22 that is at page 100 of the report -- it states that you "Ex-
23 plained to us that what had happened was that SAS contrived to
24 put ~~Arttime~~ and AMLASH together in such a way that neither knew
25 the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was Arttime

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